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NOTE

SMITH V. SALISH KOOTENAI COLLEGE:
SELF-DETERMINATION AS GOVERNING
PRINCIPLE OR AFTERTHOUGHT IN TRIBAL
CIVIL JURISDICTION JURISPRUDENCE?
Nicole E. Ducheneaux*

The Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in Smith v. Salish Kootenai College,' while unquestionably a narrow victory for the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation,
is, when viewed more broadly, just another in a long line of cases
that misguidedly defines the boundary between state and tribal
civil adjudicatory power over civil actions arising on the reservation. In its 1959 decision Williams v. Lee, 2 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that constitutional principles, case precedents and
statutory law dictate a presumption in favor of inherent tribal ad3
judicatory power over activities occurring on the reservation.
The Court has never reversed its holding in Williams, and continues to nominally uphold it.4 Yet since its decision in Montana v.
* B.A. Fort Lewis College, 2003; candidate for J.D., University of Montana School of Law, May
2007. Thank you to Professor Ray Cross for his guidance and encouragement. I am so proud to be his
pupil. Thank you also to my forebears, those fighters and activists, who are my constant inspiration:
Ernestine Roullier Ducheneaux, Delores N. Roullier, Ellen Claymore Ducheneaux, and Frank
Ducheneaux I. Special thanks to my hero and Indian law mentor, Franklin D. Ducheneaux, without
whom I wouldn't be here (literally).
1. Smith v. Salish Kootenai College, 434 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2006).
2. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
3. Id. at 220.
4. See Nev. v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438
(1997); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante,480 U.S. 9 (1987); Natl. Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow
Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2007

1

Montana Law Review, Vol. 68 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 10

212

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 68

United States,5 the Court has consistently supported a proposition
opposite what it held in Williams-that there is instead a presumption in favor of state civil jurisdiction on the reservation, relying on the theory of implicit divestiture of tribal sovereign au6
thority.
This Comment will show that while the Williams rule-that
tribal courts possess inherent adjudicatory jurisdiction over reservation-based causes of action regardless of land status or the status of the parties-may have been rendered judicially obsolete, it
is still the presumption that best serves the basic principles of federal Indian law. It is a presumption that serves both Indian and
non-Indian interests by moving toward the current federal goal of
tribal self-determination. This presumption also enhances overall
judicial economy and provides for uniformity in judicial interpretation of federal treaties, statutes, and executive orders.
This Comment will discuss the history of the Court's treatment of the scope of inherent tribal authority over reservationbased causes of action. Section I will address the foundations of
inherent tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction, highlighting the authorities that support the Williams interpretation of the scope of tribal
jurisdiction. Section II will focus on Montana and its successors,
and how they, paradoxically, both moved away from the Williams
holding and solidified the principles that underlie the Williams
presumption. Section III will explore how the recent decision in
Smith v. Salish Kootenai College fits in this line of cases. Finally,
in Section IV, this Comment will assert the reasons why we
should return to the original Williams presumption, and how this
can be accomplished by either the Court or the U.S. Congress.
I.

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, WLLIAMS, AND
THE PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF TRIBAL CIVIL ADJUDICATORY
POWER FOR ACTIONS ARISING ON THE RESERVATION

7
In 1959, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Williams v. Lee,
which stands for the proposition that, except for limited circumstances, tribes retain the inherent sovereign power to adjudicate
civil matters arising on the reservation regardless of the status of
the parties.8 In Williams, a non-Indian owner of a general store
5.
6.
7.
8.

Mont. v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
Id. at 565-66.
Williams, 358 U.S. 217.
Id. at 220.
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on the Navajo Indian Reservation brought an action in Arizona
state court to collect a debt owed him by a Navajo tribal member
and his wife. 9 The Indian defendants moved to dismiss the state
court action, arguing that the Navajo tribal court had jurisdiction
over the action.1 0 Both the Arizona trial court and the Arizona
Supreme Court held in favor of the store owner, on the grounds
that the state of Arizona had presumptive jurisdiction over civil
actions arising on the reservation absent an express act of Congress to the contrary.1 1 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide under what circumstances states have civil adjudi2
catory authority over actions arising on the reservation.'
The Court addressed this question by examining the most basic principles of federal Indian law.1 3 Principally, the Court relied
on Worcester v. Georgia,14 Chief Justice John Marshall's seminal
Indian law decision, which first articulated the foundational tenet
of Indian law that, by virtue of their interaction with the United
States, tribes have a limited kind of sovereignty through which
they retain powers of self-government. 1 5 These inherent tribal
powers of self-government generally preclude states from exerting
adjudicatory authority in Indian Country.' 6 Reviewing over one
hundred years of Indian law jurisprudence, the Williams Court
stated that this bedrock principle of Indian law shields tribes from
state jurisdiction, a principle that has remained substantially intact since 1832, except for limited circumstances in which "essential tribal relations were not involved and where the rights of Indians would not be jeopardized.' 7 Within that framework, the
Court articulated the clear rule that unless the U.S. Congress has
expressly stated otherwise, tribes exercise civil adjudicatory
power over reservation-based causes of action except when state
jurisdiction does not "infringe[ ] on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them."' 8 The Court
stated that such a rule was in agreement with Congress's "as9. Id. at 217-18.
10. Id. at 218.
11. Id.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
See Williams, 358 U.S. at 218-19.
Worcester v. Ga., 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
Id. at 520.
Williams, 358 U.S. at 219.
Id.
Id. at 220.
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sumption that the States have no power to regulate the affairs of
Indians on a reservation." 19
After examining the scope of federal statutes and the Navajo
Tribe's treaties with the U.S. government, the Court held that this
reservation-based cause of action, involving a non-Indian plaintiff
and Indian defendants, could not fall under state jurisdiction because it would "undermine the authority of the tribal courts over
Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right of the
Indians to govern themselves." 20 The Court did not qualify its
holding based on party status or the nature of the cause of action.
It called the plaintiffs non-Indian status "immaterial"; the dispositive factors were that the plaintiff was located "on the Reservation and the transaction with an Indian took place there." 21
There are two conflicting policies at issue in this opinion, each
emanating from a distinct era of federal Indian policy. First, the
Court viewed Marshall-era tribal sovereignty principles as having
modern justification in the New Deal's conception of Indian selfdetermination. 22 As the Court noted, during the New Deal era,
federal Indian policy shifted from centralizing federal control over
Indian affairs to using federal resources to promote stronger, more
organized tribal governments and tribal courts. 23 To the Williams
Court, this federal policy goal of supporting tribal self-government
solidified the legal basis for its conclusion that the Court must
presume tribal civil adjudicatory authority on the reservation. 2 4
Second, since the opinion was written in 1959, it was informed by termination-era theories that tribes as separate and
distinct political entities must be functionally destroyed in order
to integrate Indian people into mainstream society. 2 5 But this
policy consideration did not detract from the Court's finding of
presumptive tribal civil jurisdiction. Rather, the Court used termination policy, which contemplated eliminating tribes completely by act of Congress and surrendering full civil and criminal
jurisdiction to the states, 26 to reason that tribes retain all those
19. Id.
20. Id. at 223.
21. Id. at 223.
22. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. David H. Getches, Charles F. Wilkinson & Robert A. Williams Jr., Cases and
Materials on Federal Indian Law 206-07 (5th Ed., West 2005); Nell Jessop Newton, Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law 89-91 (Lexis 2005).
26. Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.
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powers not expressly divested by Congress. In this case, no act of
Congress had terminated the Navajo Tribe, hence Arizona had no
27
civil adjudicatory power on that reservation.
The opinion, written by Justice Black, appears to be unambiguous. The scope of tribal civil adjudicatory authority had evolved
little since Chief Justice Marshall's time. State authority over
reservation-based causes of action comes into being only where
there is no impact on, or overlap with, tribal self-government.
Status of the parties is immaterial. It is whether the cause of action arose on the reservation that is dispositive of tribal jurisdiction. Reiterating a fundamental principle of federal Indian law,
the Court stated that tribal sovereign power to adjudicate reservation-based civil actions remains vested in the tribes, and "[iif this
power is to be taken away from them, it is for the Congress to do
it."28

Despite the seeming clarity of this short opinion, courts and
scholars have interpreted Williams differently. Some authorities
have interpreted Williams as supporting a presumption in favor of
tribal civil adjudicatory authority, as it is interpreted above, 29 especially when viewed through the originalist or the foundationalist lens. 30 Gloria Valencia-Weber, law professor at the University
of New Mexico, has examined colonial relations between the tribes
and the crown, early American concepts of land and government,
the Articles of Confederation, the origins of the Constitution and
federal Indian law jurisprudence to conclude that the Founders,
like Justice Black in Williams, saw little if any role for the state in
Indian Country, leaving inherent adjudicatory authority with the
31
tribes.
Other authorities treat the Williams holding as more specific.
Significantly, the Court in Montana v. United States3 2 cited Williams as a primary source for the Montana exceptions. 3 3 In that
case, the Court circumscribed inherent tribal adjudicatory authority, prohibiting tribal civil regulatory power over reservation27. Id. at 220-21.
28. Id. at 223 (citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564-66 (1871)).
29. Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court's Indian Law Decisions: Deviations
from Constitutional Principles and the Crafting of JudicialSmallpox Blankets, 5 U. Pa. J.
Const. L. 405, 470 (2003); Smith v. Salish Kootenai College, 434 F.3d 1127, 1136-37 (9th
Cir. 2006).
30. Valencia-Weber, supra n. 29, at 416-17.
31. Id. at 418-20.
32. Mont. v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
33. Id. at 565-66.
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based causes of action arising on fee lands and involving nonmember defendants. 34 The Court allowed for two exceptions to this
rule, and for both of those the Court cited to Williams, among
others, as examples of those exceptions. 3 5 First, the Court noted
that a tribe could have jurisdiction in a Montana scenario if the
nonmember had "enter[ed] consensual relationships with the tribe
or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or
other arrangements." 36 Despite the lack of qualifications to the
Williams rule, the Court interpreted the nature of the nonmember's on-reservation conduct in Williams to be legally significantconduct later described by the Court as actions "involv[ing] pri37
vate commercial actors."
Second, the Court noted that a tribe could have jurisdiction in
a Montana scenario when the nonmember's "conduct threatens or
has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."38 Williams arose
from a commercial debt and is cited as an example of the second
Montana exception. It is to be inferred then that nonmember
suits against tribal members for commercial debts are sufficiently
related to a tribe's interests to invoke tribal jurisdiction, even
though the Williams Court, again, did not qualify the rule it articulated. Rather, it stated simply that the state may not "infringe[ I] on the right of reservation Indians to make their own
39
laws and be ruled by them."
II.

MONTANA V.

UNITED STATES AND ITS SUCCESSORS

In 1981, Montana v. United States kick-started the judicial
trend away from the basic presumption in favor of tribal civil jurisdiction articulated by Williams. Williams has never been overturned, but, as in Montana, its meaning has been reshaped to
limit tribal sovereignty. There are two kinds of post-Montana
cases: (1) those that reject the basic Williams presumption and
create precedent that further limits inherent tribal adjudicatory
authority; and (2) those that reject the basic Williams presumption and create positive precedent that attempts to resolve the
conflict between tribal and state adjudicatory authority.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 565-67.
Id. at 565-66.
Id. at 565.
Nev. v.Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 372 (2001).
Mont., 450 U.S. at 566.
Williams v.Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
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Montana v. United States

Montana v. United States was a federal action brought by the
United States on behalf of the Crow Tribe. 40 The United States
petitioned for declaratory judgment that the Crow Tribe and the
federal government, not the State of Montana, had the authority
to regulate hunting and fishing within the exterior boundaries of
the Crow Reservation. 41 It is significant that Montana was decided just three short years after Oliphant v. Suquamish,42 a tribal criminal jurisdiction case in which the Court held that tribal
jurisdiction over nonmembers committing crimes on the reserva43
tion had been implicitly limited, and hence no longer existed.
Although Oliphant concerns criminal jurisdiction, and hence is
not good precedent for a tribal civil jurisdiction issue, the Montana Court deliberately duplicated Oliphant's reasoning:
[T]he Indian tribes retain their inherent power to determine tribal
membership, to regulate domestic relations among members, and to
prescribe rules of inheritance for members .... But exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the depenand so cannot survive without express condent status of the tribes,
44
gressional delegation.

Both Montana and Oliphant relied on the new theory of implicit divestiture.45 Implicit divestiture diverges from the fundamental principle of Indian law that powers of inherent tribal sovereignty may only be divested by an express act of Congress: 46 the
principle relied upon by the Court in Williams v. Lee to support
the presumption in favor of tribal civil adjudicatory authority for
reservation-based causes of action. 47 Instead, Montana and Oliphant reversed that presumption, holding that absent "express
congressional delegation," 48 tribes lack power to exercise adjudicatory authority over nonmembers because that inherent sovereign
power has been "implicit[ly] divest[ed]" 49 by the nature of tribal
status relative to the U.S. government. 50 Thus, while the Wil40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Mont., 450 U.S. at 549.
Id.
Oliphant v.Suquamish, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
Id. at 208.
Mont., 450 U.S. at 564 (citation omitted).
Newton, supra n. 25, at 224-25.
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564-66 (1871).
Williams v.Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
Mont., 450 U.S. at 564.
Id.; U.S. v.Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978).
Mont., 450 U.S. at 564; Oliphant v. Suquamish, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).
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liams rule was never explicitly overruled by succeeding cases, the
theory of implicit divestiture altered its meaning after the fact.
The result was an enormous restriction of inherent tribal adjudicatory authority over reservation-based causes of action. Where
Williams stood for the proposition that the Court presumes tribal
authority in civil cases unless there is essentially no impact on a
tribe's inherent right to govern within its own territory, 5 1 since
Montana there is a presumption in favor of state jurisdiction
where the action takes place on fee land on the reservation and
the defendant is a nonmember, unless one of the two Montana ex52
ceptions applies.
B.

54
Strate v. A-1 Contracting 53 and Nevada v. Hicks:
Montana's Successors Restricting Tribal
Adjudicatory Authority

Two recent cases have extended Montana's holding, further
limiting the power of tribes to adjudicate reservation-based causes
of action. Strate v. A-1 Contracting5 5 and Nevada v. Hicks5 6 deal
respectively with the scope of the Montana exceptions and
whether Montana applies to tribally-owned lands held in trust by
the federal government. In these cases, the Court construed the
scope of the basic premise of Montana broadly, while at the same
time construing the scope of the Montana exceptions narrowly-a
tendency that does little to promote tribal self-government.
In Strate, the Court held that neither Montana exception applied when a nonmember plaintiff sued a nonmember defendant
for injuries arising from a car accident that occurred on a statemaintained right-of-way on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation
in North Dakota. 5 7 The Court ruled that Montana controlled
under the facts because no statute or treaty governed jurisdiction
(meaning state jurisdiction was presumed) 58 and also because the
cause of action arose on alienated, non-Indian land rather than
59
tribal land held in trust by the United States.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.
Mont., 450 U.S. at 565-66.
Strate v. A-1 Contractors,520 U.S. 438 (1997).
Nev. v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
Strate, 520 U.S. 438.
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353.
Strate, 520 U.S. at 442-44, 457.
Id. at 453.
Id. at 456.
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The petitioners argued that the first Montana exception applied in this case because A-1 Contractors was engaged in subcontract work for the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation at the time of the accident, which, they argued, was a
"consensual relationship[ ] with the [T]ribe[s]."60 The Court reviewed the fact scenarios in the three cases the Montana court
cited as examples of the first exception, and concluded that a tribal landscaping subcontract was not an activity contemplated as a
consensual relationship. 61 Other than citing the decision below
for the fact that the plaintiff was not a party to the subcontract
and referring uncritically to the three illustrative cases from the
Montana decision, the Court did not analyze or explain why a
tribe's interest in self-government was not affected by a lawsuit
arising from activities relating to a business transaction between
a tribe and a nonmember subcontractor, as under the Strate facts.
The Montana Court's examples illustrating when a "consensual relationship" existed are just as uncritical and unclear about
when the exception can be applied. The cited examples reveal
that a "consensual relationship" existed in two instances in which
the action arose directly from interaction between an individual
tribal member and a nonmember, and in the instances implicating
a tribe's ability to directly tax nonmembers in a business transaction. 62 Neither Strate nor Montana reveals why those particular
scenarios infringe on the right of the tribe to govern itself under
the retained Williams rule, while others do not.
The United States next argued that the second Montana exception applied because negligent behavior on reservation highways necessarily affected the "health or welfare of the tribe" and
its members. 63 Interestingly, the Court agreed with this assertion, stating that "[u]ndoubtedly, those who drive carelessly on a
public highway running through a reservation.., surely jeopardize the safety of tribal members." 64 But the Court held that this
was not enough, and instead cited Williams for the proposition
that in order to satisfy this exception the tribe's adjudicatory authority must implicate "the right of reservation Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them."65 The Court referred to
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 456-57.
Id. at 457.
Id.
Strate, 520 U.S. at 457 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 457-58.
Id. at 458 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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several examples from Montana showing when the second exception is applied. 66 The cited examples included where all parties to
an adoption were tribal member residents of the reservation, the
Williams scenario of a lawsuit arising from an on-reservation commercial debt, and property tax cases involving non-Indian owned
livestock. 6 7 According to the Court, the cited cases involved situations that implicated internal tribal relations and, as the Strate
fact scenario did not constitute such a case, the second exception
was not applicable. 68 Again, with little analysis, the Court concluded that authority over ensuring the safety of reservation highways does not implicate this right of Indians to make their own
laws, while authority over commercial debts does.
It is unclear what legally concrete, precedential conclusions
can be drawn from Strate because of the paucity of the Court's
discussion and analysis. But if the "whys" of this case are uncertain, what is certain is that the Court read the Montana exceptions very narrowly. Instead of reading the exceptions as in keeping with the long-understood principles of tribal sovereignty and
the modern policy of tribal self-determination, the Court held that
the exceptions will apply only when they match the few examples
provided by the Montana court.
The second significant recent case that limited the scope of
tribal adjudicatory power over reservation-based causes of action
is Nevada v. Hicks.69 In Hicks, a Fallon Paiute-Shoshone tribal
member living on the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Reservation in Nevada brought actions in tribal court against individual state game
wardens for tortious conduct and civil rights violations in their
search of his home on tribally-owned reservation land. 70 Justice
Scalia wrote the opinion in which the Court held "tribal authority
to regulate state officers in executing process related to the violation, off reservation, of state laws is not essential to tribal selfgovernment or internal relations-to 'the right to make laws and
71
be ruled by them."'
A significant development in Hicks is the Court's pronouncement that, although Montana's rule arose from a specific fact scenario occurring on "lands . . .owned in fee simple by non-Indi66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 459.
Nev. v.Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
Id. at 355-57.
Id. at 364.
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ans,"7 2 the status of the land was intended to be just one non-dispositive factor. 73 The Court broadened the Montana holding
beyond its fact scenario, and created a new rule in which state
power over reservation causes of action involving nonmembers is
always presumed, and the most significant factor is whether tribal
"[s]elf-government and internal relations"7 4 are at issue.
Although the state of tribal adjudicatory power over reservation-based causes of action has changed since 1959, Hicks represents a total about-face from Williams's basic presumption in
favor of tribal authority over those causes of action. Williams was
premised on the joint congressional and judicial "assumption that
the States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a
reservation."7 5 Absent an express act of Congress to the contrary,
that power remains in the tribes unless the state action does not
infringe on "the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be ruled by them."7 6 Throwing that fundamental Indian
law tenet to the wind, Justice Scalia in Hicks instead announced
that "[sItates' inherent jurisdiction on reservations can of course
be stripped by Congress. But with regard to the jurisdiction at
issue here that has not occurred." 7 7 Interestingly, the Court cited
to an 1896 criminal jurisdiction case for this proposition, 78 and ignored Williams completely.
Strate and Hicks reveal the existing Court's consistent bias
against the presumption in favor of tribal civil adjudicatory authority. The Court viewed the Montana rule broadly, prohibiting
tribal jurisdiction in fact scenarios not implicated in the original
decision, and applied the exceptions in only the narrowest of
cases. In these two cases, the Court demonstrated its commitment to limiting tribal civil adjudicatory authority wherever possible.

72. Mont. v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544, 547 (1981).
73. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 370.
74. Id. at 371.
75. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
76. Id.
77. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 365 (citing Draperv. U.S., 164 U.S. 240, 242-43 (1896)) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
78. Draper, 164 U.S. at 241.
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National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe 79 and
Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante:8 0 Montana's
Successors CreatingPositive Statements
of Indian Law

Less than ten years after Montana, the Court decided two Indian law cases that further refined tribal civil adjudicatory authority, and reaffirmed the joint congressional and judicial commitment to enhancing tribal self-determination and self-government. Neither National Farmers Union nor Iowa Mutual
retreated from Montana's holding, but their proximity in time to
Montana reveal the intended scope and purpose behind the rule
and its exceptions better than the later cases.
In National Farmers Union Insurance v. Crow Tribe,8 ' a minor Crow tribal member was injured by a motorcyclist on elementary school grounds on the Crow Reservation. 2 The plaintiffs
guardian brought an action against the school district in Crow
Tribal Court,8 3 and served process on the school board chairman,
who failed to notify anyone else of the suit.8 4 As a result, default
85
judgment was eventually entered against the school district.
The defendant insurance company and the school board subsequently sought redress in the federal district court, which granted
a permanent injunction against the Crow Tribal Court, stating
86
that the Tribe lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, and the U. S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the federal district court could enjoin a tribal court on the basis of lack of subject
87
matter jurisdiction.
The Court held that, on these facts, tribal civil adjudicatory
authority over the non-Indian defendants was not precluded by
law, and could be determined by examining the reach of tribal sovereignty-whether that sovereignty has been divested, and
whether statutes, treaties, or federal precedent impacted the extent of tribal jurisdiction.8 8 The Court established that this deter79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Nati. Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
Natl. Farmers Union Ins., 471 U.S. 845.
Id. at 847.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 848-49.
Natl. Farmers Union Ins., 471 U.S. at 847, 849.
Id. at 855-56.
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mination is one that must first be reached by the tribal court.8 9
Therefore, where tribal civil adjudicatory authority is at issue, a
federal court may not act until tribal remedies are exhausted. 90
The Court premised this holding on two governing judicial
policies. First, and most importantly, exhaustion of tribal remedies best serves the modern federal policy of enhancing "tribal
self-government and self-determination," to which the Court and
the U. S. Congress have long demonstrated commitment. 9 1 Not
only does exhaustion allow the tribe to exercise its powers of selfgovernment, it provides an opportunity for a tribal appellate court
to examine its decision and "rectify any errors."92 In essence, the
Court suggested that even where tribal jurisdiction is lacking, exhaustion serves tribal self-determination because it encourages
tribal courts to learn from their mistakes by both deciding the law
and explaining that law to the parties.
Second, the Court noted that exhaustion of tribal remedies
has the effect of enhancing judicial economy because, when the
tribal court has been allowed to complete its inquiry into the basis
for its jurisdiction over the action, the result is the development of
a full record, which can be relied upon by any succeeding federal
court. 93 The federal court and the parties are not then required to
visit the issues anew. Furthermore, where federal Indian law
may be a murky, unfamiliar subject to mainstream law practitioners and judges, the tribal record gives the federal actors the "benefit of [the tribal court's] expertise in such matters in the event of
94
further judicial review."
The Court's articulation of its commitment to tribal self-determination is of paramount significance in NationalFarmersUnion.
When tribal civil adjudicatory powers are at issue, the Court
seems to say that the U. S. Congress and the federal courts are
governed by a commitment to enhancing and protecting tribes'
ability to govern themselves. The few limitations to the exhaustion rule occur when the tribal action is brought in bad faith,
where jurisdiction is expressly prohibited, or when the objecting
party's opportunity to object to tribal court jurisdiction is inadequate. 95 The National Farmers Union Court thus expressed its
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 856.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 857.
Natl. Farmers Union Ins., 471 U.S. at 856.
Id. at 857.
Id. at 857 n. 21.
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respect for tribal governments and institutions, committing itself
to both protecting and strengthening tribal self-government.
Just two years later, the Court decided Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante,96 another tort action, this time arising on
the Blackfeet Reservation in Montana, in which a tribal member
sued a nonmember insurance company in tribal court.9 7 Where
the National Farmers Union defendants sought the federal forum
on federal question jurisdiction, here the defendants sought the
federal forum on diversity jurisdiction. 9 They were denied at the
circuit court level based on National Farmers Union's exhaustion
rule.9 9 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
the extent of the exhaustion rule. 10 0
The Court upheld, but refined, the Ninth Circuit's ruling that
tribal remedies must be exhausted before federal jurisdiction is
allowed: exhaustion of tribal remedies is not a jurisdictional requirement before the federal court may decide whether tribal civil
jurisdiction exists; rather it is matter of comity between the federal and tribal jurisdictions. 10 1
While perhaps weakening the tribal exhaustion rule, Iowa
Mutual reaffirms the judicial policy of supporting and respecting
tribal self-government. The Court noted the various ways that the
Court and Congress have encouraged tribal self-government
through the protection of tribal court jurisdiction, including federal statutes providing for the training of tribal judges, the legal
difference between divested criminal powers and retained civil
powers, and the long-held doctrine that state jurisdiction is precluded when it interferes with tribal self-government. 10 2 Tribal
remedies should be exhausted, not just respected at the trial court
level, because a commitment to self-government means that tribal
appellate courts must be allowed to review the determinations of
their lower courts. 10 3 The Court stated that "[tihe federal policy of
promoting tribal self-government encompasses the development of
the entire tribal court system." 10 4 Moreover, the Court rejected
96. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante,480 U.S. 9 (1987).
97. Id. at 11.
98. Id. at 12-14.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 14.
101. Id. at 15-16, 16 n. 8.
102. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 14-15, 15 n. 6 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217,
220 (1959)).
103. Id. at 16-17.
104. Id.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol68/iss1/10

14

Ducheneaux: Tribal Civil Jurisdiction

2007

TRIBAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

225

out-of-hand the insurance company's assertion that tribal court
incompetence precluded tribal exhaustion, 0 5 because such an exception to the exhaustion rule would be "contrary to the congres10 6
sional policy promoting the development of tribal courts."
The cases deciding tribal civil adjudicatory authority immediately succeeding the Montana decision create positive law which,
while not expanding the scope of tribal civil jurisdiction beyond
what Montana circumscribed, reiterated the long-held judicial understanding, affirmed in Williams, that tribal sovereignty meant
tribal self-government-a worthy and compelling federal policy.
III.

SMITH V. SALISH KOOTENA

COLLEGE

Smith v. Salish Kootenai College (Smith II),107 an en banc decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, reversing its own
three-judge panel decision (Smith I),108 is the most recent in this
discordant chorus of federal opinions on the scope of tribal civil
adjudicatory authority. But despite being closer in time to Strate
and Hicks, Smith If represents a philosophical return to the positive ideals embodied in Iowa Mutual and National Farmers
Union. Like those decisions, it neither expands nor diminishes
the scope of tribal civil jurisdiction from that prescribed in Montana, but reiterates the important policy foundations of tribes' adjudicatory authority.
The dispute in Smith arose from a single-car automobile accident occurring on the Flathead Reservation in Montana, home to
the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, in which one passenger was killed and the driver and a second passenger were seriously injured.' 0 9 The vehicle, which rolled over because of a
structural failure, was a dump truck owned by the tribal college,
Salish Kootenai College (SKC), where all three persons involved
in the accident were students. 1 0 Smith, an Indian enrolled in another tribe, was driving as part of a college course."' Smith and
SKC were named as defendants in tort actions in tribal court, and
105. Id. at 18.
106. Id. at 19.
107. Smith v. Salish Kootenai College, 434 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2006) [hereinafter Smith

Inl.
11.

108. Smith v. Salish Kootenai College, 378 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Smith
109. Smith 11, 434 F.3d at 1129.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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Smith cross-claimed against SKC.112 Eventually, all the claims
except for Smith's action against the college were settled, so the
tribal court realigned the parties with Smith named as plaintiff,
and SKC as the defendant. 11 3 After a tribal jury returned a verdict against Smith, he asserted for the first time that the tribal
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.1 1 4 Smith took this argument to both the tribal appeals court and to the federal district
court, where he asserted an original action for negligent failure to
maintain the vehicle and spoliation of evidence.1 15 When both
courts affirmed tribal court subject matter jurisdiction, Smith ap16
pealed to the Ninth Circuit.
A three-judge panel reversed the federal district court and tribal court's decisions. 11 7 The panel held that Smith was a nonmember to whom the Montana rule applied. 1 8 Land status was
immaterial to the decision. 19 The court did not seriously consider
that the allegedly negligent failure to maintain the vehicle would
have occurred on tribal property, because according to Hicks,
Montana applies regardless of land status. 20 Moreover, neither
Montana exception was implicated because: (1) Smith's enrollment at SKC was too attenuated from his negligence claim
against the school to constitute a consensual relationship with a
tribe or tribal member;' 2 ' and (2) a "simple tort suit against a
community college" does not rise to the level of serious "imperil[ment of tribal] . . . political integrity . . . or the health and
1 22
welfare of the Tribe."
In May 2005, the Ninth Circuit vacated that decision and
granted en banc review.' 2 3 The en banc court agreed that the
Montana rule applied because Smith was a nonmember, and considered two threshold factors to determine how, if at all, to apply
the Montana exceptions. 1 2 4 First, the Court sought to determine
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Smith 11, 434 F.3d at 1129-30.
116. Id.
117. Smith I, 378 F.3d at 1051.
118. Id. at 1052-53.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1056-57.
122. Id. at 1059.
123. Smith v. Salish Kootenai College, 407 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 2005), vacating Smith I,
378 U.S. 1048.
124. Smith 11, 434 F.3d at 1131.
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the party status of the nonmember-plaintiff or defendant-because "membership status of the unconsenting party ... [is] the
primary jurisdictional fact." 125 Next, the court considered
126
whether the cause of action arose on tribal or non-tribal land.
Interestingly, where the three-judge panel dismissed this fact as
irrelevant under Hicks,127 the en banc court cited Hicks for the
proposition that, while it is not dispositive, land status is at least
a factor-and in this case an important one to which the Hicks
1 28
Court gave significant consideration.
The en banc court examined these threshold factors at length.
Regarding party status, it was accepted that Smith was not a
member, and the court concluded that SKC was "a tribal entity,
and, for purposes of civil tribal court jurisdiction, may be treated
as though it were a tribal 'member.'"' 29 Regarding land status,
the court inquired whether Smith's tort action had a "direct connection to tribal lands." 30 The court concluded that the causes of
action (negligent failure to maintain the vehicle and spoliation of
evidence) all necessarily occurred at the college-on tribal
lands.131
With those threshold questions resolved, the court moved on
to a discussion of whether either of the Montana exceptions applied, and, if so, based on party and land status, which exception
would govern. 132 The court's analysis is interesting because it
avoided the narrow interpretation of the exceptions found in
Strate and Hicks, and yet neither flouted nor rejected the holdings
in those cases; rather the court defined the Smith facts as more
complex, and thus outside the scope of those holdings.
The court noted that Hicks did not apply under these facts
because the nonmember party in Hicks did not "voluntarily submit[ I ... to tribal regulatory jurisdiction," and here, Smith voluntarily brought his cross-claim in tribal court.' 3 3 And Strate did
not apply to Smith because Strate referred to the issues of "'the
adjudicatory authority of tribal courts over personal injury actions
against defendants who are not tribal members,"' and here the
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. (quoting Nev. v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 382 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring)).
Id.
Smith I, 378 F.3d at 1052.
Smith 11, 434 F.3d at 1131.
Id. at 1135.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1136 (quoting Nev. v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 372 (2001)).
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nonmember party was the plaintiff. 13 4 Since Hicks and Strate
could not, therefore, be analogized to the facts, the court looked
elsewhere for a tribal civil jurisdiction case that best matched the
Smith facts, and from which it could determine the applicability of
the Montana exceptions. That case was Williams.13 5
Williams best analogized to the Smith facts first on very basic
grounds: the plaintiff in both cases was the nonmember, and the
defendant in both cases was the member. 136 More specifically,
however, the nonmember in both cases satisfied the first Montana
exception under the same circumstances because both engaged in
consensual relationships with a tribe or its members. 13 7 It was
immaterial that the consensual relationship in Williams was a
commercial transaction and the consensual relationship in Smith
was Smith's suit in tribal court.138 It was also immaterial to the
court that Williams predated the formulation of the Montana exceptions, because it was cited as a model for both exceptions.' 3 9
On first glance, this would seem out of line with Strate's narrow holding on the first exception, and its rejection of the tribal
subcontract as a consensual relationship.140 But since the Strate
Court failed to elaborate on why the tribal subcontract did not fit
the first exception,' 4 ' and because the Smith relationship was
nothing like a tribal subcontract, there was no legal reason why
the Smith II court couldn't conclude that Smith's suit created a
consensual relationship. Indeed, the Smith II court justified its
finding that a voluntary nonmember suit in tribal court is a consensual relationship under Montana, despite its lack of commercial character, because "civil tribal jurisdiction [should not] turn
on finely-wrought distinctions between contract and tort."142
Instead, the Smith II court examined the policy behind the
first exception and found that the overriding rationale for allowing
tribal jurisdiction where a nonmember is in a consensual relationship with the tribe or its members is the element of choice on the
134.
(1997))
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Smith 11, 434 F.3d at 1136 (quoting Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442
(emphasis in Smith II).
Id. at 1136-37.
Id. at 1136.
Id. at 1137.
Id.
Id.
Strate v. A-1 Contractors,520 U.S. 438, 457 (1997).
Id.
Smith 11, 434 F.3d at 1137.
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part of the nonmember. 14 3 According to the court, the first Montana exception is something like the due process analysis for personal jurisdiction in non-Indian civil law matters, hinging on the
meaningful contacts established by the nonmember and whether
they were purposeful. 14 Smith established a meaningful contact
with the tribe-he purposefully formed a relationship by bringing
his cross-claim in tribal court-and thus he satisfied the first
Montana exception and precluded assertion of state jurisdic14 5
tion.
IV.

SELF-DETERMINATION AND TRIBAL

CIVIL

ADJUDICATORY AUTHORITY

Federal jurisprudence from 1959, when the U.S. Supreme
Court decided Williams, through 2006, when the Ninth Circuit
rendered its opinion in Smith H, reveals some legal truths about
tribal adjudicatory authority over reservation-based causes of action. The true scope of that inherent tribal power is reflected in
the monumental rise of tribal self-determination in federal Indian
law in the last quarter of the twentieth century, as well as in the
language of the Montana exceptions. Tribal self-determination
and tribal self-government have been the guiding, constant theme
throughout these tribal civil jurisdiction cases. Even Williams v.
Lee, 14 6 informed by the Indian termination era, 147 framed the
boundary between tribal and state jurisdiction as one defined by
"the right of the Indians to govern themselves." 48 Williams was
decided during an era when tribal sovereignty and tribal self-government were so little valued in federal Indian policy that Congress was willing to completely extinguish the tribal existence of
such "assimilated" tribes as the Menominee of Wisconsin. 14 9 Yet
Williams articulated the rule that states have no civil adjudicatory power over Indian reservations unless the power does not "infringe[] on the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be ruled by them."150
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 1138.
Id.
Id. at 1140.
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
Id. at 220-21.
Id. at 223.
25 U.S.C. §§ 891-902 (repealed 1973).
Williams, 358 U.S. at 220.
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Even Montana reaffirmed the importance of tribal self-determination and self-government. Indeed, the Court's reasoning for
prohibiting tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers on fee land was
premised on the idea that tribal jurisdiction exists to "protect tribal self-government [and] to control internal relations." 15 1 This is
likely the reason the Court formulated the second Montana exception, allowing tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers on fee land
where the nonmember's "conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health
or welfare of the tribe." 1 52 Self-government cannot exist where
the sovereign has no power to use its laws to protect its political
integrity, its security, or the health and welfare of its citizens.
In addition, the exhaustion doctrine of National Farmers
Union and Iowa Mutual follows the commitment to tribal self-government established by Williams and Montana.153 As discussed
above, Smith II returned to the pro-self-determination stance first
articulated in Williams. The only cases in this series of tribal civil
jurisdiction that did not rely on the policy of Indian self-determination were Strate and Hicks, but perhaps they are anomalies.
Is it strange that National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual
were more in line with Montana's commitment to self-determination than Strate and Hicks? Likely not. The former were much
closer in time to Montana, at four and six years after respectively.
Strate and Hicks, on the other hand, were decided sixteen and
twenty years after Montana, respectively.
The two exhaustion cases perhaps had a better perspective on
the original policy and meaning behind the Montana decision if
only because of proximity in time. Moreover, Justices Thurgood
Marshall and John Paul Stevens, who authored Iowa Mutual and
NationalFarmersUnion respectively, may have better understood
Justice Stewart's intent in Montana because both served on the
bench with him. 154 Perhaps they were echoing Stewart's tribal
self-determination philosophy. It is not clear how Justice Stewart's understanding of the scope of tribal government was formed,
151. Mont. v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
152. Id. at 566.
153. Natl. Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985); Iowa Mut.
Ins. Co. v. LaPlante,480 U.S. 9, 14-17 (1987).
154. The S. Ct. Historical Socy., History of the Court: Timeline of the Justices, http://
www.supremecourthistory.org/02_history/substimelinel02_a.html (accessed Apr. 1, 2006);
The S. Ct. Historical Socy., History of the Court: The Current Court - John Paul Stevens,
httpJ/www.supremecourthistory.org/02_history/subs-current/images-b/003.html (accessed
Apr. 1, 2006).
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but it may be revealing that his first year on the bench was
1959-the year Williams was decided. 15 5 Neither Justices Scalia
nor Ginsburg, authors of Hicks and Strate, ever served with the
15 6
author of the Montana decision.
Self-determination should be the overriding concern when Indian civil jurisdiction is at issue. Self-determination is not a concept that applies solely to American Indian tribes. As a legal principle, it is most recognizably found in discussions of emerging nation-states throughout the world. 15 7 With origins in the French
and American Revolutions, the concept requires that "government
be responsible to the people." 158 And some scholars of Indian law
have postulated that the confused mess of Indian dependence on
the government and the intertwining of jurisdictions could be
solved if the U.S. government further fostered Indian self-determination, as it did in post-World War II Europe.1 59 As such, the
United States could establish "something of a Marshall Plan for
American Indians, [which] would be offset by long-term savings in
social costs." 160 Such a project could achieve what the United
States attempted during the termination era, but instead of extinguishing Indian sovereignty, enhancing it to terminate Indian reliance on the federal government.
The Court used self-determination principles to justify exhaustion of tribal remedies, encouraging tribes' exercise of power
over reservation-based causes of action, avoiding needless burdens on state and federal governments.' 61 The Court was not saying two different things when it justified tribal exhaustion both on
tribal self-determination grounds and judicial economy grounds.
Tribal self-determination, when tribal civil adjudicatory powers
are at issue, necessarily means judicial economy for state and fed155. The S. Ct. Historical Socy., History of the Court: Timeline of the Justices, http:/!
www.supremecourthistory.org/02_history/subs-.timeline02-a.html (accessed Apr. 1, 2006);
Williams, 358 U.S. 217.
156. The S. Ct. Historical Socy., History of the Court: The Current Court -Antonin
Scalia, http://www.supremecourthistory.org/02_history/subs-currentimages-b/002.html
(accessed Apr. 1, 2006); The S. Ct. Historical Socy., History of the Court: The Current Court
- Ruth Bader Ginsburg, http'//www.supremecourthistory.org/02_history/subs-currentl
imagesb/006.html (accessed Apr. 1, 2006).
157. See Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge U. Press 1995).
158. Id. at 11.
159. Roxanne Dunbar Ortiz, Indians of the Americas: Human Rights and Self-Determination 178 (Praeger 1984).
160. Id.
161. See Natl. FarmersUnion Ins. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985); Iowa Mut.
Ins. v. LaPlante,480 U.S. 9, 14-17 (1987).
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eral governments. Where tribes have the power and ability to adjudicate reservation-based causes of action, it logically follows
that the burden on the non-Indian forum will be lessened,
whether by keeping the dispute out of the non-Indian courts altogether, or producing a judicial record which, by comity, allows the
non-Indian forum to rely on the tribal court's findings of fact or its
expertise in federal Indian law.
Furthermore, the great body of Indian law, which has confounded and frustrated legal practitioners since Chief Justice
Marshall's time, could be greatly streamlined and simplified by
reasserting inherent tribal adjudicatory authority over reservation-based causes of action. At present, there are three jurisdictional forces making law and interpreting treaties and statutes
relating to Indian affairs. The decisions of state courts, federal
courts, and tribal courts on the same issues of Indian law are, at
best, slightly out of sync with each other.
Take for instance a recent decision of the Montana Supreme
Court deciding whether a certified Indian-owned business may be
considered a member of an Indian tribe in order to invoke one of
the Montana exceptions. 16 2 In Zempel v. Liberty, a tavern owned
by a tribal member, located on the Flathead Indian reservation,
and certified as an Indian-owned business by the Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribes, was named as a defendant in an action arising from a drunken driving accident brought by a nonmember plaintiff. 163 The defendant tavern asserted that its Indian-owned business status made it a tribal member such that the
Montana exceptions should be applied.164 The Montana Supreme
Court arrived at its conclusion in a way that follows the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Smith H, interpreting the same federal precedent that would be relied upon in federal or tribal court.' 6 5 But it
created new Montana state precedent on tribal membership of corporations for Montana exception purposes16 6-an issue that has
not yet been addressed by the Ninth Circuit. So Montana practitioners litigating a similar issue must take into consideration parallel precedent, which while not contradictory, is not in sync with
the body of federal law on tribal civil adjudicatory authority. This,
it should be noted, is probably a relatively benign example of what
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Zempel v. Liberty, 143 P.3d 123, 127, 132 (Mont. 2006).
Id. at 126-27.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 130-34.
Id. at 132.
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can happen when several jurisdictions decide the same issue of
federal Indian law under different fact scenarios and without interacting. The reassertion of presumed, inherent tribal civil adjudicatory authority over reservation-based causes of action would
likely limit such inconsistencies between federal and state law.
V.

CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF TRIBAL CIVIL ADJUDICATORY
AUTHORITY OVER RESERVATION-BASED CAUSES OF ACTION

Only by act of Congress or decision of the U.S. Supreme Court
will the reinsertion of self-determination principles into the discussion of tribal civil adjudicatory authority, and the reassertion
of inherent tribal civil adjudicatory authority over reservationbased causes be achieved. Both scenarios are possible.
Strate and Hicks were aberrations, out of line with the true
meaning and scope of tribal civil jurisdiction jurisprudence in federal court. Those cases' interpretations of Williams and Montana
were anomalous errors, and their exclusion of self-determination
and self-government as primary principles behind tribal civil jurisdiction were mistakes that ought to be corrected. Although the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Smith If is less persuasive than the
Supreme Court's decisions in Strate and Hicks, it reveals that
Strate and Hicks may be so far afield from the true meaning of
tribal civil jurisdiction that a court can reasonably and legally decide such an issue within Montana's constraints without running
afoul of either of those decisions.
While it does not reveal how the U.S. Supreme Court might
evaluate future tribal civil jurisdiction cases, in June of 2006, the
Court denied Smith's petition for certiorari, and let stand the
Ninth Circuit's judgment. 167 At the very least, this denial of certiorari demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit's commitment to selfdetermination in a tribal civil jurisdiction analysis was not contradictory to current law.
However, it is not clear that the current Supreme Court is
poised to move back toward Williams and greater respect for tribal self-determination. But even absent a willing Court, the U.S.
Congress exercises plenary power over Indian affairs. 168 In response to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Duro v. Reina, in
which the Court held that tribes have no criminal adjudicatory
powers over nonmember Indians committing on-reservations
167. Smith v. Salish Kootenai College, 126 S. Ct. 2893 (2006).
168. See e.g. U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378-85 (1886).
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crimes, 1 69 Congress, recognizing a jurisdictional void created by
the Duro decision, 170 enacted the "Duro fix." This amendment to
the Indian Civil Rights Act relaxed Duro's judicial restriction of
tribal sovereign powers, and reaffirmed tribal adjudicatory au171
thority over nonmember Indians.
In U.S. v. Lara, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the ability
of Congress to redefine the metes and bounds of tribal sover1 72
eignty, essentially without limitation, upholding the Duro fix.
If a new Congress can be convinced, as the Williams, Montana,
NationalFarmers Union, and Iowa Mutual Courts were, that selfdetermination is the most advantageous and consistent policy consideration behind defining the scope of tribal civil adjudicatory authority, then it is possible that tribes could regain a significant
measure of their inherent power over on-reservation civil matters.
Such a statute (a civil Duro fix) could bring the United States and
tribes closer to a realization of self-determination, which would
enhance tribal sovereignty, lessen the tribal burden on the United
States and create greater consistency in the interpretation of Indian law.

169.
170.
171.
172.

Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 692 (1990).
Id. at 697-98.
25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000).
U.S. v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 199-200 (2004).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol68/iss1/10

24

